IN trying to estimate the work of a particular philosopher it seems natural enough to begin with a description of the history and circumstances of the man himself. And yet it is almost invariably the case that most, if not all, of these biographical items are gradually lost sight of as the main business of interpreting and criticizing advances. We include our knowledge of the man in an introductory chapter, and rarely, if ever, refer to it. As a result, the philosopher and his work seem to be things apart. The work becomes a contribution to philosophy, distinguished, in a personal sense, from other contributions by little more than the convenient symbol of its author's name.
A philosopher will himself admit that this impersonal attitude of philosophy to philosophers is the object and criterion of his own efforts. He attempts to give an account of his facts and problems unbiassed by his private feelings and opinions. It is the discipline he has to undergo in order to become a philosopher. What he is in search of is the Truth, and at his best he regards himself as simply its medium or vehicle. We are therefore doing him no injustice when we judge his theory impersonally or simply as a theory. Like the maxim of the just man in any vocation, the motto of the earnest seeker after truth is " I serve." To such it does not matter who set free the secrets of nature, harnessed her forces, fashioned human societies, or discovered the beauty, goodness, and truth of men and of things. It is enough that these things are done. What matters is the deed, not he who did it. And, we may add, even where the author's name is known, did he, after all, do much more than harvest the thoughts and efforts of a thousand nameless ones ?
These observations provoke a problem which it is the purpose of this paper to solve. Is the understanding of a philosopher's work necessarily dependent on a knowledge of his life ? If it is, are we to suppose that all facts in his history are significant, or only certain of these ? And, in the latter event, what standard of significance can we discover ?
ii 481 There can, of course, be no question that biographical information has a certain value. It has, for example, what we commonly call " human " interest. It is natural that we should be curious about the personalities and careers of the authors whose books we read. But such human interest does not of itself carry us very far to the solution of the problem we are raising. For it possesses no intrinsic standard or principle of order. From the merely " human " standpoint the things that may stimulate interest in biography seem to be as infinite and varied as the number and characters of those whose interest is aroused.
More important from our point of view is the fact that most works of philosophy contain allusions and references to previous and contemporaneous doctrines. This relates them to incidents in their authors' careers and circumstances; and, therefore, in these respects, the work of interpreting philosophy must be dependent on that of the biographer and historian. Nevertheless, it is very questionable if this fact proves such an essential relationship between the man and his work as would make it absolutely necessary for us to know his life and circumstances in order to understand his philosophy. This conclusion would follow only if the philosophy itself contains its author's history as part of its intrinsic meaning.
And there is a further difficulty. Granting the instrumental value of biographical knowledge, in the sense that particular items of information about an author's life help us to understand his point of view, how are we to select from the available biographical material the facts that would provide others with the means of approach to an author's standpoint ? For in spite of obvious mental similarities, the order of learning of each one of us is characteristically different. Thus, if we make a selection, it is difficult to see how it can be other than arbitrary. The other alternative, then, is to follow Pliny's advice on how to become a successful orator and supply as much information as possible on the off chance, but no more, that each item may find its appropriate mark.
The difficulty into which biography, regarded as a means to theoretical understanding, leads, seems, then, to imply that if a philosopher's biography stands in a significant relation to the content of his system, the selection of the relevant biographical facts cannot be left to the individual interpreter's own judgment or purpose. In other words, we must recognize that if biography has an order relevant to the understanding of a philosopher's point of view, it possesses it not in itself, but in virtue of the order or relation of ideas in the philosopher's system. We should note, however, that there is another and more drastic alternative. It may be that, in trying to understand and evaluate 482 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BIOGRAPHY a philosopher's solution of the fundamental problems of philosophy, we must, like the thinker himself, adopt a completely impersonal attitude, and dismiss all historical information about him as useless and irrelevant. This, in effect at least, is what Heine intended in his remark about Kant, that "It is a difficult matter to write the life-history of Immanuel Kant, for he had neither life nor history." In other words, the vigour and significance of Kant's thought had nothing whatever to do with his actual life and circumstances, which were, in his case, as nearly mechanical as is humanly possible.
II
So far, we have assumed that the content of a philosophical system is the important fact about a philosopher, and that his biography is simply a means to the understanding of this. Largely as a result of this assumption, we have reached two possible answers.
Either biographical information about a philosopher has no philosophical interest at all, or, as aids to interpretation, selected portions of it acquire meaning by reference to standards provided by the system they help to interpret. But, if for no other reason than the drastic nature of the former of these alternatives, it is only fair to reverse the order of things and ask what would happen if biography was the end and philosophy only the instrument. As we will see later, this demand is not unreasonable, and while it is not contained in the form in which we have stated our problem, the conditions of the problem are not complete without it. Meanwhile it is sufficient to note that this reversal of values could provide an answer which is just as extreme as the one which entirely denies the instrumental value of biography. For, even if we did not go so far as to say that in any particular case the philosophy was the philosopher, we would have to say that it was humanity or drama or history, or some universalized representation of persons. In this event, the " human " interest in biography which we were inclined to regard as subordinately significant would be supreme, and Hamlet, say, or a good History, from which the more irrelevant items of personal experience had been omitted, would be the highest achievement of the mind.
Fully stated, then, the answer to our problem varies between two extremes. Either biography has no value or it is all-important. But while we must retain the latter possibility as the lower limit, as it were, of our problem, we cannot regard it as on the same independent level as the alternatives that biography has some value or that it has none at all. For our particular concern is with the significance of biography to philosophy, and while this implies the right of philosophy to challenge biography, it would widen our 483 problem too much to reverse the position and discuss with equal ireedom the right of biography to challenge philosophy. In the latter event our problem would be a sub-form of the much wider question : " Is theory or history the ultimate guide to reality ? " Inevitably, of course, our future discussion will border very closely at times upon this ultimate question. But both the form in which our immediate problem is couched and the facts on which it is based limit the sense in which " history " will be used. In a word, the argument will abstract the essential feature of history, viz. its creative character, but give it a setting which is directly related to theory and is commonly regarded, indeed, as a part of the sphere of philosophy.
What this will mean exactly can be made clearer by a restatement of the observations which provoked our problem. These suggested in effect that both the content of philosophy and the attitude of philosophers to their work are alike impersonal. Hence the difficulty of relating biography to philosophy in spite of the fact that the latter seems to require the former, although in a regulated way, in order to understand itself or the ideas of its exponents. But, it is important to note, a new fact has emerged in our problem since this difficulty was first stated. For even as an aid to interpretation the justification of biography is not merely a matter for philosophy itself to decide and regulate, but can be substantiated by an observation just as valid apparently as the supposed impersonal character of philosophy. Otherwise there would be no real problem at all. And it is in respect of this basis in fact that biography substantiates its position as against philosophy by drawing upon, as it were, its relation to history. For, in a word, along side of the evidence for the impersonal nature of philosophy there can be put the fact that a philosopher is at once the author of his philosophy and his biography! And because of the ultimacy of creation as a fact or value this seems to cancel any suggestion of arbitrariness in the relation between the two interests.
Is there, then, any attitude to life sufficiently final and universal to dispute the way with philosophy, an attitude which contains the creative element in biography as part of its meaning, and is, at the same time, directly related to theory or is itself a form of philosophy ? In a sense to be defined below, we will call this attitude the " ethical," and, in similar fashion, will appropriate for our own use the term " metaphysical " to describe the impersonal character of philosophy with which the ethical is at once contrasted and united.
Our particular problem, therefore, expands into or is a subform of the question : " Is metaphysics or • ethics the ultimate guide to reality ? " And as an approach to this question, we will 484 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BIOGRAPHY begin with the inquiry : " Is philosophy, as technically understood, impersonal or not ? "
III
The view that philosophy is impersonal is the direct result of assuming that the central task of philosophy is to answer certain fundamental problems. The more these problems are regarded as fixed and perennial, the more severely impersonal does the attitude become. For if the business of philosophy is to answer questions, it follows that conclusions are of the first importance. Indeed, where the answers to problems are known the way of approach to them counts for nothing. To take a simple example : it does not matter in the slightest to the answer itself whether I come to the conclusions of one of the geometrical propositions through tears and heart-burnings or you with intellectual and emotional facility. The meaning of the answer contains no suggestion as to the media or means of approach or anything whatever of your experience or mine. Within its limits, which are determined for it by the whole system of mathematical knowledge, it is a finished article with the " rough work " completely on the other side. It is true that you and I have this knowledge, but the "you" and " I " are, without any exaggeration, just the mathematical concept itself, and are to all appearance completely identical. If then, like the mathematical proposition, the answers to philosophical problems are given, biographical information in the case of a particular philosopher is altogether negligible. In this connection it is worthy of note that those philosophies which have approached most nearly to the scientific or mathematical model have, on the whole, been highly sceptical of human or personal values.
But, it will be said, one has only to look at the conflicting opinions amongst philosophers, past and present, to disprove the appearance of any fixity or similarity in their answers to philosophical problems; and while this is certainly not the highest type of argument, the observation suggests an important modification of our problem. For the history of philosophical speculation gives every ground for the belief that the serious concern of philosophy is not to discover the correct answers to its problems, but the correct method of finding these answers.
Here we are on the threshold of the wider issues we have already hinted at, and for our particular purpose a great deal depends on the general line of thought we decide to take. Two ways are open to us. Admitting in either case that the solutions to philosophical problems are always subject to doubt, and that this applies to the method of finding these answers as well as to the answers themselves, we can either say that the process of knowing is undetermined 485 JOURNAL OF FHlLOSOPttiCAL STUDIES except by itself, or that it is determined or circumscribed in a formal but very real sense. On the former view, knowing is creating, time and history are all-important, and theory is simply the framework of which the human mind, with its spontaneous emotions and conduct, is the life and soul. The latter view denies all historical and personal values, and dismisses time and process as irrelevant.
The contradictory nature of these alternatives makes it necessary for us to take stock of our discussion at this point. For it is obvious that it is now bordering very closely on the relation of history to theory which we decided above to pass over in favour of the less harsh relationship of ethics and metaphysics. At the same time the mathematical model of philosophical inquiry has not been unknown in the history of philosophy, and we can therefore proceed to compensate the severity of its conclusions with an equally abstract interpretation of the ethical standpoint without doing any real injustice to the facts or in any way prejudicing our rational desire to discover later a via media between the two extremes.
Severely or abstractly regarded, the ethical standpoint completely inverts the rigidly metaphysical or mathematical. For, in the moral life, character and the making of character count for everything. In my character I carry my order of learning with me. My character represents all my struggles, all my successes and achievements, and also, and more significantly still, all my failures. In general, moral process is a continued effort after selftranscendence, and the highest moral authority is that which springs from the free nature of the moral person. In other words, what I judge to be morally real must be pre-eminently my own, something which I produce for myself. But the morally real and objective is not a fixed thing like the properties of a geometrical figure. It is an ideal which expands with the growth of character and the realization of new responsibilities and interests. For the moral being to halt is to stagnate and die. The struggle and contradictions of life are as essential to character as the ideal that represents their unity, the harmony which the moral person is obliged, or obliges itself, to actualize under conditions of time and place and in relation to other selves. When, then, creative morality is taken as supremely typical of life and existence, the making of problems rather than their solution along fixed or formal lines, the human and practical worth of speculation rather than the disinterested love and search for knowledge, the intuitive grasp of the life and spirit of individual philosophies rather than judgments upon what is impersonal and common to every system, and, in particular, a philosopher's biography, the recapturing of the psychological and circumstantial reasons which led him to his view, 486 and leads us to appreciate and advance his view, must be taken to be the appropriate objects of philosophical inquiry.
If, then, the strictly mathematical model entirely dehumanizes philosophy, the creative element in morality leads to a view of the world in which finite personality is of first significance. But by the terms of our problem we are committed to the attempt to find a " philosophical" solution somewhere within these limits. How, then, is it possible for philosophy to mediate between the extremes of impersonality and personality, and yet do justice to the essential features of both ? Two things are necessary. On the one hand metaphysics must model itself on some less rigorous standpoint than the mathematical, some interest which is directly related to moral experience, but which, at the same time, has all the dispassion and universality a metaphysics must have. This will involve that while the answers and problems of philosophy must submit to theoretical forms and standards which are fundamentally identical in all occasions and circumstances, they are not absolutely fixed or determined. On the other hand, the ethical standpoint will have to be sufficiently modified to admit that theory and permanence are just as much its own characteristics as practice and change. This will mean that the finite or personal self must acknowledge its dependence on something ultimate and infinite for the source of that creative quality within itself which gives meaning and order to its otherwise worthless and heterogeneous experience.
While, however, the next stage in our discussion will attempt a solution of the larger issues of our problem on the assumption that the metaphysical and the ethical standpoints are complementary rather than diametrically opposite, the onus of proof for the assumption will be taken as having to come much more from the metaplrysical than the ethical side. This means that stress will still be laid on the creative aspect of life almost as if, indeed, it could remain in the supreme and " metaphysical " position we have just pictured. This, it will be granted, is only right. For, after all, it is the status of biography, not of philosophy, that is really in question. Further, on the more general ground that the moral or more directly human life is the meeting-place for all contending claims in philosophy, we will try as far as possible to keep the argument at the moral level.
IV
The difference between philosophy regarded as bounded and regulated by given and permanent forms of thought, and as concerned at the same time with problems and answers that are continually being modified, is the familiar distinction in theory of 487 knowledge between discovery and creation. In the moral life it is best expressed by the contrast between receptiveness and production. The latter terms express an essential difference in the attitude which the finite or ethical self adopts to its experience as a whole. On the one hand, in receptiveness the self finds itself furnished with capacities for feeling, willing, and knowing in a world which is already made for it. Thus its business in life is to will itself into such an attitude that it may discover and appreciate, through feeling and intelligence, the infinite implications, values, or relations of its own being, or, inversely, permit the world to reveal and communicate its meaning and content through the medium of finite agents. While this view is capable of modification according to the emphasis laid on religion, art, or on logic, the experience denoted by receptiveness is essentially the same in all three, although, for various reasons, morality is more intimately concerned with its religious expression.
On the other hand, from the point of view of " production " the world as a whole as well as the finite beings that compose it is considered to be in process of change or becoming. At every moment it assumes new values and proportions which are not, or only inadequately, translatable in terms of its past. Thus, in a word, the universe is a history and presumably a progress. In any event it is not a fact, but an act. Hence for either the universal or finite mind to live it is continually to make it anew.
As we have seen, in appearance at least the latter view has much more kinship than the notion of receptiveness with the moral life, which, as commonly conceived, is never content with things as they are, but as they ought to be. Thus those who advocate creative development as the fundamental attitude of mind are accused by the opposite school of using the moral life, with all the conflict, finitude, and endlessness which it properly seems to possess, as the key to the meaning of reality as a whole. That, of course, only an extreme form of the productivity theory sees no content whatever, and nothing but movement in the life of spirit is obvious from the study of current activistic philosophies. Indeed, in all cases where they apply there scarcely seems to be any question that productiveness and receptiveness are mutually compatible notions. But, as already indicated, what is really at issue is not their special validity, but the significance or emphasis which should be laid on one or the other of these concepts in the interpretation of experience as a whole. On the one hand, then, moral ideas and institutions change and apparently progress. For, even if we rule out progress from our consideration, there seems to be no sense in saying that the ideals THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BIOGRAPHY of any stage or epoch are simply the expansion of what already was, or was implicitly in the beginning or at any previous stage. Grant whatever continuity you may, modern standards of conduct are not those of the past; and only a very abstract type of universalism can shut its eyes to the fact that something new has been born and something old has been lost.
On the other hand, there can scarcely be any question that moral facts display as thoroughgoing a spirit of acquiescence and acceptance as of creativeness and production. For apart from the general fact that the finite self finds the demands of feeling and reason unsatisfied save by absolute wholeness and system, it must be said for the receptive point of view that even the will, as the fundamental moral activity, can, by an uninterrupted expansion of its own powers, find realization, in the religious consciousness, for example, not merely in the future, but here and now, and in every possible circumstance and situation. Thus, if in its ethical aspect the attitude of receptiveness involves an absolute whole, and yet must fulfil the conditions of particularity, change, and freedom, no less must productiveness satisfy the need of the same moral self for an ever-present and thorough fulfilment of its need for the infinite. For Absolutism or Creativism,' to give them proper names, to omit either the finite or the infinite aspect of the moral self is to do injustice, if not to a " science " of morals, at least to the moral life as we see it exemplified in the characters of individuals.
We have already indicated sufficiently for our purpose the direction towards which Creativism leans in the solution of the problem of the kind of relationship which should exist between the interpretation of a particular philosophy and the biography of its author.
Creativism leaves the discrimination of the relevant and irrelevant features in biography to flashes of insight akin to the artist's or dramatist's. Only by entering into and as far as possible living again the actual life of the philosopher can we understand what he means.
On the other hand, Absolutism claims to include all that is true in Creativism, but in a different order, and one which is more in accord with the facts.
As already suggested, the fundamental thing in Absolutism is the assumption that the real order of things already and always is. Otherwise feeling and knowing are subjective responses with nothing objective to stimulate them, and what they reveal in art, religion, or the philosophic and natural sciences, comes out of nothing. This, however, is a possibility which only a theory which is driven to it by the logic of its defective assumptions is prepared to admit with regard to other contents of experience. The laws of life or of physical nature do not merely come to be when some finite mind discovers them. The scientist, we say, attempts to view the objects of his inquiry unbiassed by his own particular likes and dislikes, and is successful both in theory and in practice only in so far as he does so. Indeed, as in mathematics, as we have seen, subjective difficulties or abilities due to time and circumstance-what we have called " orders of learning "-are in no way contained in the objective meaning or truth, once this is reached. But apart from questions of end or achievement, the Absolutist goes deeper, and is prepared to say that the scientist could not even begin to think unless he assumed, with the kind of rational faith which is appropriate to him, that what he was trying to find was already there. Can it then be otherwise with art, religion, and the human sciences where the principles and values discovered are even more enduring and universal, both in meaning and practical consequences ? The Absolutist takes his stand on the fact, fundamental for him, that no such line can possibly be drawn, and throws the onus of proof to the contrary on any view which tries to maintain a radical difference in our methods of apprehension. For the Absolutist there is only one method of judging, and while this undoubtedly differs in detail according to specific differences in content, there is no distinction in principle. Thus when faced with the difficulty of accounting for the creative aspects of rational judgment which arises in an acute form from consideration of what finite responsibility means for moral experience, the Absolutist falls back on the sheer impossibility of reflective or self-conscious experience without the assumption that such system and order have their objective counterparts. Moreover, against those of his opponents who may assert that experiment rather than logic is the only appropriate method of dealing with such facts, he is prepared to maintain that to any competent observer receptiveness and not production is by far the more dominant feature of what is positive and valuable in any type of morality or concrete moral character.
It follows from the starting-point of Absolutism that the meaning and value of progress or of productivity is wholly derived from or subordinate to the " Here and Now " rationality of the universe. Indeed, the more abstract types of Absolutism, originating mainly from the standpoint and method of mathematics, are quite frank in pointing out the purely illusory character of history. On the other hand, the Absolutism which approaches philosophy from 490 religion and art, and with which morality is particularly concerned, admits that progress, although an " appearance " has something of the concrete nature of these experiences. This, however, is the limit of the concession which Absolutism is prepared to make to the contention of the Creativist or Meliorist. Progress is real, but it is a finite category--the readjusting and ordering on the part of finite selves of what for them is always present and given. Thus progress is never the addition of something wholly new; its novelty is always affected within a system or series of systems which occasion it. At its lowest is exists in a continuum of feeling where differences are just beginning to be revealed; and at its highest it is achieved in the light of the ultimate values or principles revealed in religion, art, and philosophy. Within these limits history and progress run their course.
Because the activities of finite selves are assumed by the Absolutist to be contained within the system of reality, it follows that for him there are two types or aspects of progress which, while never apart, are quite distinguishable. Much of the confusion which surrounds the Absolutist point of view is caused by the failure of its critics to keep this significant difference in mind. Even certain Absolutists themselves are not altogether free from this fault, although in their case confusion is due to a tendency to make the distinction between the two orders far too abrupt. For the sake of convenience we will call the one aspect of progress " the order of learning" (appearance) and the other " the order of reality." In general, the first order is that which more directly belongs to finite selves in virtue of their finiteness; the second is the reflected activities which finite selves possess through conscious relationship with the ultimate scheme of things, or with any lesser system within this. The dividing line between the two is that moment of experience when self-reflection or self-awareness intervenes in any attempt to understand experience.
In more detail, the order of learning is the way of approach which finite selves make to any persistent attitude of experience within which there is principle, system, or value. For example, in the case of goodness most of us find it difficult enough to reach, far less to maintain and advance upon, standards or levels of conduct already laid down for us by the political, social, and religious environment into which we are born. The severe and continued discipline necessary to achieve such mental or spiritual attitudes is roughly what is implied by the order of learning.
On the whole, this aspect of progress is different for individual selves in view of the local and temporal distinctions which mark the origin of their special activities. But apart from particular differences (which to the observer are incommensurable), there is 491 a finiteness which belongs to finite selves in general, or to the finite self as such, due mainly to the discursive character of his method of apprehension. Unable to grasp a total situation in its entirety the (human) understanding selects such data as it requires for a theoretical or practical purpose, with the result that friction and contradiction arise when in their turn the rejected elements demand to be satisfied. In one sense, what is occurring in this procedure is not something foreign to the first purpose. Although in itself a specific grouping of subordinate elements, any purpose is simply an element in a relatively closed system or particular universe of discourse ; and in the last resort, of course, it is a feature of the absolutely closed system of reality. Thus in being compelled to return and take up into itself what at first it had rejected, the finite self is learning that an order exists within the content of its experience which it cannot escape without loss or dissatisfaction.
As spread over the whole of finite experience, this order (of recognizing, so to speak, the real order of things) is the Absolutist notion of time or history. In other words, there is a certain " timing " in the effective realization of an}' purpose or of finite purposes as a whole ; whereas to effect a purpose abstractly or without regard to the total situation in which it exists results in conflict or contradiction. A political law or ideal imposed on a people which has not yet reached the mental level necessary to realize it, is, as we commonly say, " out of time " or " untimely," and the same holds good of the particular person when, in the discipline of learning anything at all, he attempts to grasp the higher stages without having first embodied in his character the essential rudiments of his subject. That the finite self continually thinks and acts abstractly, or can never exhaust the infinite implications of even the commonest objects to which it attends, is the reason why friction and contradiction characterize the temporal process. On the other hand, the power of the finite self to reach a relative synthesis of conflicting elements by its ability to contrast, compare, and memorize, throws the content of human experience into something like the fashion of the real order of things, and makes a long view of human history a true appearance or progress. Continuous in actual fact with the order of learning, but at the opposite extreme from it in meaning, is the order of reality or of universal and objective values. Here time is subordinated, and in spite of local and temporal limitations the finite self can pass with relative ease from any part of the system of reality to any other, in virtue of its grasp of those values or principles which penetrate and sustain the whole. In the order of learning progress is an advance-a graduated series of levels which the finite self is capable of occupying. But once the self has experienced the 492 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BIOGRAPHY vision of ultimate beauty, love, or truth, there is no going beyond it. On the whole goodness consists in maintaining this attitude. But even in this sense the good life is never static, although it possesses a different kind of dynamic from the discursiveness and friction which distinguishes the order of learning. Moreover, progress does not end here. With the highest once glimpsed in knowledge, art, or religion, the order of learning turns inwards, and progress acquires a new direction. The self becomes infected with the creative capacities of these disciplines, and attempts to inform the otherwise discrepant features of its experience with something of their infinite meaning.
But, unlike the order of learning, what the order of values creates is not, strictly speaking, " additional " to experience. The regenesis which results from contact with the infinite and accompanies the birth of individuality either in a person or era is not a new " fact " in the sense in which that term is properly used of the acquisition of a particular object of knowledge. On the contrary, its character, which covers and colours the whole of life, is that of a new standpoint or attitude from which the finite self can review and reorganize the experience it already has. Of course, any recognition b3
? finite selves of the complete order of things has the appearance of causing an enlargement of their experience. But, properly speaking, it simply brings to light facts and relations that had previously escaped their notice or been only very loosely understood. In Platonic language, mere opinion is raised to the level of scientific apprehension. Thus, our recognition of the order of reality is not unpractical or unproductive. On the contrary, it possesses the truest kind of productibility which is only seen in principled thought and conduct.
The appearance of an increase to the present content of the knowledge of finite selves through a new or more concrete apprehension of final principles or values is, for the Absolutist, the proper significance of what we have termed the order of learning, or what is usually called development, history, or progress. In this connection the point of importance to note is that the cause which actually stimulates the order of learning is not to be found in the latter itself, but in the higher order of values. This does not or need not imply that time or history, although appearances, are therefore unreal. The selection and consequent rejection of material which the finite self makes, even in the most universal of its purposes, is essential to its nature and a fundamental condition of its finiteness. This, however, is only one aspect, and by no means the more significant aspect of the nature of the self. Were the self unable to recognize in a formal but none the less very real manner the continuity or system in which its purposes are 493 affected, it would be impossible for it to include later in a wider and more harmonious end the elements which at any particular stage in its development its finiteness compelled it to reject or subordinate. In one sense, therefore, it is what is infinite in finite personality which sets a new purpose agoing, and in another sense forces the finite self to maintain a certain order in the way in which it develops. And as we commonly attribute both these characteristics to temporal process, the true stimulus of the order of learning, both in its incommensurable and its commensurable aspects, is the order of reality. Moreover, because the communion which the finite self is capable of having with the ultimate scheme of things is largely independent of time and place, the order of values gives to temporal activity the character, not of an urge from behind or in front, but of a selection and combination of an infinite material which crowds around it like a spiritual atmosphere. That, of course, human experience exhibits the appearance of the pursuit of an end or even indeed of an inner or inherent propulsion is a matter of ordinary observation. But, like time, these are simply appearances, real enough as partial manifestations, but not the whole truth of what takes place. Both of them, when expanded, lead to the values and meanings characteristic of system.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BIOGRAPHY
is among the highest achievements of a philosopher, as it is of the artist in his appropriate medium. The history of philosophical speculation is divided into such moments of insight. A concept becomes discriminated from out the wholesale blending of primitive feelings in which it is first embedded, and if it is big enough the chances are that a new science or point of view is originated. This is the true " order " of learning. For a concept is the universal meaning of a manifold of things, circumstances, times, or persons, which acquires defmiteness and real particularity when seen through the concept. And not merely to discover, but to rediscover the idea (which is the more usual experience of most of us) is the discipline which all of us must undergo in the search for truth. But to recapture its meaning does not mean, as the Creativist argues, that every succeeding age or particular mind must live again the circumstances in which the idea first arose. Great ideas are democratic, not in the sense that every one or every age can recognize them in a way uniformly the same, but that they can understand them in some way. Indeed, to recognize their ramifications through the whole of experience is just the task of the philosopher when he ceases to be the artist. For the same reason he must relate the concept on which he is especially engaged with other concepts known or discovered elsewhere, try to fit it into its appropriate place in the system of concepts. But in both these duties the philosopher must obey a higher order than the order of learning. To perform them adequately he must have a standard which is indirectly the criterion of history, but is intimately and directly the standard of knowledge or theory itself. As we commonly say, he must submit his doctrines to the laws of thought-laws which, in the way in which he has approached them, he must also regard as the laws of things, as these are locally and temporally known. Simply stated, these laws of thought imply that in the disciplined thinker's arguments there must be no hiatus, no loose edges, or in a word, no contradiction. Hence the doctrines of a particular philosopher must be judged by their self-consistency-a theoretical consistency, however, which must be referred to the facts they attempt to crystallize into concepts.
And as regards the man's own life and circumstances, these facts become relevant in so far as they are contained or referred to in the central concepts with which he works. It is this fact-the fact that we are indebted to a particular thinker for concepts, points of view or even words that reveal the values or meanings of experience in new lights-that determines how much of his own life and times must be introduced into a discussion that is primarily concerned with the ultimate satisfactoriness of the explanations that 495
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his doctrines afford. For, in a word, the concept is the man. It is that part of his mind which is successful. Thus the soul of a thinker is just as much yours or mine as it is his own. For the idea reveals his essential self, the truth of his age and circumstances, and in the end the real world of all actual and possible rational minds. This is the true explanation of the use of the term " impersonal" as applied to the scientist's or philosopher's attitude. So far as his work is successful-satisfies, that is to say, the canons of philosophical judgment or of any knowledge or practice that is systematic and harmonious within its own limits or kind-the man is his work. This does not mean that his mere biographythat part of his life and circumstances which led to the concept, but is not contained within it-has no value. As we have already indicated, it may help us enormously to rediscover the concept for ourselves, and unfold more of its implications. But this kind of knowledge is in the truest sense a mere means. It possesses no order that the finite mind can grasp and use as a rule. Like examples and illustrations to which it directly corresponds, it can do as much harm as good by hindering the facile flow of truly rational thought. It is true that no thought of ours can altogether escape these indeterminable contacts, and when a large enough view is taken this is by no means a defect. A truly significant idea may flood with new meaning this or that part of what is otherwise a mere manifold of experience. This, however, implies the advance of thought and not, as our immediate question is, the attitude of the human mind to biography at any particular moment.
It is because, it omits the significance of the apparently unmeaning that the mathematical type of reason is too severely impersonal. It over-emphasizes form to the exclusion of content; and where this content is the feelings, desires, and actions of human beings, the possible significance of the trivial and seemingly irrelevant is a commonplace. But larger forces than the human mind at any particular moment must reveal these. On the other hand, the forms or order of knowledge, and, therefore, of organized conduct or action which is effective, is within our grasp at all times, and it makes relevant and significant whatever in human affairs contains universal and conceptual possibilities-humanity itself, eras, systems, nations, groups, and, in a defined but important sense, human persons themselves.
